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Chile put into place broad free trade agreements (FTAs) with its two major trading
partners: the EU (eﬀective 2003) and the US (eﬀective 2004). This paper quanti-
ﬁes their economic eﬀects for the Chilean economy, stemming from the conventional
trade components (lower tariﬀs and higher market access) and other aspects of the lat-
ter broad FTAs, including improved intellectual property rights, factor productivity
gains, and their ﬁscal consequences (tax compensation, larger customs expenditure).
The paper also considers that the country risk premium may decline and aggregate
investment may rise in response to the institutional stability and policy credibility
enhanced by the FTAs. Simulation results are reported for steady states and dy-
namic transition paths, based on a three-sector dynamic general equilibrium model
for an open economy inhabited by inﬁnitely-lived representative agents. The model
is calibrated to the Chilean economy and the actual features of both trade agree-
ments. Due to Chile’s high initial trade openness, the reported eﬀe c t so fF T A so n
resource allocations, relative prices, expenditure composition, welfare, output, and
agregate consumption do not exceed 1% in any given period. On impact, the largest
gains come from a lower risk premium that leads to a temporary consumption and
investment boom, which is reverted in the long run as a result of larger net foreign
liabilities. In steady state, the gains from improved factor productivity dominate all
other eﬀects.
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JEL Classiﬁcation: F13, O54, F41.On Chile’s FTA with the U.S.:
“Regarding growth, the FTA will add zero”
Sebastian Edwards, interviewed in El Mercurio (2003).
“The FTA ... causes a strong increase in output (10.02%)”
Coeymans and Larraín (1994), pp 383.
1 Introduction
Since the early 1990s Chile has negotiated and implemented preferential trade agree-
ments (PTAs) with several countries and regions. Among the latter, the most impor-
tant are the recent free trade agreements (FTAs) with the European Union (eﬀective
since 2003) and the United States (eﬀective since 2004). Chile’s PTAs have comple-
mented continued unilateral trade liberalization, reﬂected in a gradual lowering of its
almost uniform ad-valorem tariﬀ rate, from 11% in 1998 to 6% in 2003 and thereafter.
Except for few remaining tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers on selected agricultural goods,
as a result of price bands, Chile’s sector-speciﬁc barriers and non-tariﬀ restrictions
are virtually non-existent.1
Considering Chile’s high degree of trade openness, the economic eﬀects of Chile’s
PTAs with countries and regions are likely to be small in comparison to those observed
in countries with higher barriers to trade. On the other hand, low general tariﬀsa l s o
reduce the likelihood that the welfare costs from trade diversion eﬀects of PTAs more
than oﬀset the welfare beneﬁts from trade creation and larger market access.
The FTAs implemented recently by Chile with the EU and particularly with the
U.S. comprise several dimensions of international integration that go well beyond the
traditional, narrow scope of trade liberalization and market access of goods. They
refer to a broad set of laws, regulations, and administrative practices related to trade
in services, capital ﬂows, property rights, health and safety standards, environmental
regulation, and regulatory and judicial transparency, among others. Therefore these
broad FTAs also lead to a wide range of potential growth and welfare eﬀects that go
well beyond conventional trade creation and diversion eﬀects. Moreover, it is possi-
ble that the legal and regulatory changes and new administrative practices required
by broad FTAs, consistent with industrial-country policies and regulations, have a
positive eﬀect on institutional development and policy stability, hence contributing
to stronger policy credibility and lower country risk premiums. This may raise the
international demand for Chilean liabilities, contributing to larger capital inﬂows and
lower interest rates, boosting investment and growth.
Several studies conducted over the past dozen years — before the negotiations
were closed and the agreements came into eﬀect — provide quantitative estimates of
1As domestic production of luxury cars is nil, a luxury consumption tax on cars acts as a de facto
tariﬀ.
1possible economic eﬀects of Chile’s FTAs with the U.S. and the EU.2 Coeymans and
Larraín (1994), Hinojosa-Ojeda et al (1997), and Brown et al (1998, 2001) estimate
the eﬀects of the FTA with the U.S. SIA Chile-EU (2002) assesses the impact of the
F T Aw i t ht h eE U .H a r r i s o ne ta l( 1 9 9 7 ,2 0 0 1, 2003) estimate the separate and joint
gains of Chile’s agreements with NAFTA, the EU, and MERCOSUR.
The latter studies develop and use multi-sector computable general-equilibrium
(CGE) models for Chile and/or for a world economy comprised by several regions
and countries, including Chile. The models allow for rich sector disaggregation and
hence provide estimates of potential production, expenditure, and trade eﬀects at
the sector level, as well as aggregate output and welfare consequences of Chile’s
FTAs. The models are static in the sense that production and expenditure decisions
are not intertemporal and assets are not optimally accumulated over time. Hence,
their results should be interpreted as long-run eﬀects of Chile’s FTAs. However,
some of the latter studies model not only the net trade gains from FTAs but also
consider indirect gains due to higher aggregate capital, in response to (an exogenously
determined) lower country risk premium and a corresponding permanent decline in
the cost of capital.
Regarding quantitative results, a common pattern is observed across the ﬁve afore-
mentioned sets of studies. First, conventional welfare and output level eﬀects due to
the traditional trade channels (trade creation net of diversion, and considering im-
proved market access) are relatively small. The long-term output gain of the FTA
with the U.S. is estimated at a narrow range that extends from 0.26% (Hinojosa-Ojeda
et al, 1997) to 1.23% (Harrison et al, 1997) of Chile’s pre-FTA GDP. Harrison et al
(2003) also estimate welfare eﬀects of Chile’s actual and hypothetical FTAs with its
major trading partner regions. Their welfare estimates (as a fraction of Chile’s GDP)
of combined free trade with NAFTA, MERCOSUR, the EU, and the rest of South
America ranges between 2.66% and 5.71%, evaluated at an initial current uniform
tariﬀ of 6%.3
Second, the studies that consider indirect gains reaped from larger capital invest-
ment in response to lower country risk (and hence lower capital cost and/or larger
foreign investment) show a large dispersion in their reported results. Considering
both direct trade eﬀects and larger capital stock eﬀects, the overall estimated net
output level gain ranges from 0.5% of Chile’s GDP for the FTA with the EU (SIA
Chile-EU), to 5.15% of GDP for the FTA with the U.S. (Brown et al 1998), and to
10.02% of GDP, also for the agreement with the U.S. (Coeymans and Larraín 1994).
Considering the large dispersion of simulation results and views about the eco-
nomic eﬀects of Chile’s FTAs — reﬂected by the above mentioned quotations by dis-
2Cabezas (2003) provides a useful comparative summary of these studies.
3Harrison et al (2003) interestingly illustrate the well-known theoretical result that the sign of
t h en e tw e l f a r ea n do u t p u te ﬀe c t so fF T A si sa m b i g u o u s . T h i ss t u d ys h o w st h a taF T Aw i t h
MERCOSUR is welfare deteriorating for Chile at an initial uniform tariﬀ of 11% (prevalent in the
mid 1990s) but turns into a welfare-improving agreement at the current uniform tariﬀ of 6%.
2tinguished economists — the purpose of this paper is to provide a fresh look on this
issue. We report new estimates for Chile’s combined eﬀe c t so fi t sF T A sw i t ht h eE U
and the U.S., considering both their narrow trade aspects and several of their wider
non-trade dimensions. In addition to the consequences of lower tariﬀsi nC h i l ea n di n
the trading partners, we consider the eﬀects of improved property rights (crackdown
on piracy of intellectual property), TFP gains from trade expansion and EU coop-
eration funding, VAT compensation for lower tariﬀs, larger customs administration
expenditure, and lower country risk premiums.
We set up a three-sector dynamic general equilibrium model for a small open
economy, inhabited by representative inﬁnitely-lived agents that face an upward-
sloping supply of foreign capital, reﬂecting an endogenous country risk premium.
The model is calibrated to the main features of Chile’s actual trade agreements with
the EU and the U.S. and to the base year 2002. We include estimates of the likely
consequences of the agreements on selected variables.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes Chile’s FTAs with the
EU and the U.S. Section 3 presents the dynamic general equilibrium model and its cal-
ibration for Chile. Model simulation results for the FTAs are reported subsequently,
ﬁrst for steady-state eﬀects and then for the dynamic eﬀects, on the composition
of output and consumption, trade, the real exchange rate, aggregate consumption,
output, and welfare. Section 5 concludes.
2 Brief Description of Chile’s PTAs
Chile has pursued an active policy of negotiating PTAs with several countries and
regions since 1991, complemented by unilateral trade liberalization. PTAs are in
place within ALADI and with MERCOSUR (comprised by its four full members
Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay). Chile has implemented bilateral PTAs
with Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Bilateral FTAs are in place
with Canada, Mexico, and Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua). After long negotiations, Chile signed FTAs with its two
major trading partners: the EU (in eﬀect since February 2003) and the U.S. (in eﬀect
since January 2004).
Further FTAs signed with EFTA and Korea will be implemented soon. Future
trade negotiations may lead to trade agreements with additional countries, including
New Zealand, Singapore, India, China, and Japan. Of Chile’s total trade in 2003,
55% took place with countries that have trade agreements that either are already in
place or will be implemented shortly.
Chile’s broad FTAs with the EU and, particularly, with the U.S., extend well
beyond the elimination of trade barriers. They encompass adoption of standards and
norms in trade of goods and services (including tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers, export
subsidies, rules of origin, and customs procedures), health and security standards,
trade restrictions, government procurement, foreign investment and capital ﬂows,
3business services and visits, ﬁnancial services, telecommunications, electronic trade,
market competition, intellectual property rights, labor market regulation, environ-
mental protection, transparency in legal and judicial changes, and conﬂict resolution.4
FTAs are the outcome of lengthy individual negotiations with many country-
speciﬁc features; hence important diﬀerences are observed among them. One main
diﬀerence is that the agreement with the EU includes a “positive list” that establishes
quotas for each product that can be imported at a zero tariﬀ. The agreement with
the U.S. establishes eventual attainment of free trade; therefore it includes a list of
products for which tariﬀs are gradually reduced to zero.
Chile’s agreement with the EU involves three components: trade agreement, eco-
nomic cooperation, and political association. The ﬁrst component relates to trade
of goods and services (with a separate treatment of ﬁshing and wine). Tariﬀsa r e
lowered within the limits of the quota imposed for diﬀerent products. Temporary
protection increases with compensations that are allowed in case the domestic sec-
tor is “damaged”. WTO guidelines must be followed when anti-dumping restrictions
are imposed. The principle of most favored nation is applied to ﬁnancial services,
but capital ﬂows restrictions are allowed. Economic cooperation funding by the EU
(technical assistance, technology transfers, joint research projects, and promotion of
investment) is expected to increase.
Chile’s FTA with the US does not include economic cooperation and political asso-
ciation but is much more comprehensive regarding economic policies and institutions
than the agreement in place with the EU. Free trade with the U.S. is attained over a
transition period that extends from zero to 12 years, as reﬂected by product-speciﬁc
time schedules of trade liberalization. For Chile it imposes abolition of luxury taxes
on cars (in 5 years) and price bands on agricultural products (in 12 years). For the
U.S. the agreement imposes gradual elimination of subsidies on agricultural exports
and of quantitative restrictions on Chilean exports. Safeguards can only be applied
during the 12-year transition period for agricultural products, but for 10 years in
the case of bilateral safeguards. Regarding anti-dumping policies, both parties agree
to follow WTO rules. In terms of investment, ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial services,
and telecommunications regulation, the FTA agreement conﬁrms principles that are
already in place. It also conﬁrms multilateral agreements concerning intellectual
property rights protection that had already been signed by Chile. The FTA accel-
erates implementation of regulations to protect intellectual property rights and their
enforcement. Chilecompromise to honor its actual environmental and labor-market
regulations. On the other hand, the U.S. oﬀers cooperation for the reduction of en-
vironmental damage in agriculture, mining, and forestry, as well as advice on the use
of clean fuels, and environmental supervision and enforcement.
In sum, both broad FTAs adopted by Chile in the recent past include provisions
with potentially important eﬀects on relative prices, resource allocations, consump-
4The appendix lists the general areas and speciﬁc contents of Chile’s FTAs with the EU and the
U.S.
4tion, investment, trade, output, and welfare, that stretch well beyond the conse-
quences of a narrow trade liberalization. We focus now on a suitable model to assess
the wider consequences of broad FTAs.
3M o d e l l i n g T r a d e E ﬀects
This section presents the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that
is used to quantify the eﬀects of FTAs on diﬀerent variables. FTAs are modelled
here as changes in the tax and tariﬀ structure of the economy and the accompanying
changes in ﬁscal policy.
3.1 The Model
The DSGE model considers three sectors (exportable, importable, and non tradables).
3.1.1 The Households
The economy is inhabited by a representative agent who maximizes the expected






where cm,t and cn,t represent period t consumption of an importable (m) and a non
tradable good (n). The other good produced in this economy is not consumed at
home; we denote this good as the exportable good (x).
The maximization of (1) is done subject to the budget constraint5
(1 + τm)(1+τcm)cm +( 1+τcn)cnp +( 1+τm)(1+τcm)i +( 1+e r)b ≤ (2)
(1 − τk)(1+τm)(1+τcm)rk + b+1 + F + πx + πm + πn.
where τm is an import tariﬀ, τcn and τcm are taxes on the consumption of non
tradables and importables, p is the relative price of the non tradable good in terms
of the importable good (used as numeraire), b i st h ea m o u n to ff o r e i g nd e b tt h a tt h e
private agent contracted from abroad on the previous period, e r is the (net) interest
rate paid on that debt, τk is a tax on capital income levied by the government, r is
t h er e n t a lr a t eo fc a p i t a ls t o c kt h a ti sg i v e nt ot h eﬁrms of the three sectors, πx, πm,
and πn are the proﬁts of the exportable, importable and non tradable sectors, F is
a lump sum transfer from the government to households, and i is investment, which
satisﬁes the standard law of motion for capital:
k+1 =( 1− δ)k + i, (3)
5For brevity, time t subscripts are eliminated.
5where δ is the depreciation rate of the capital stock and k is the capital stock. As k
is expressed in units of the importable good, it is also subject to the same taxes of
the importable good destined to consumption (tariﬀsa n dt h ev a l u ea d d e dt a x ) .
The problem of the representative consumer can be summarized by the value
function that satisﬁes:
V (sh)= m a x
cm,ch,b+1,k+1
{u(cm,c n)+βE [V (sh,+1)]}, (4)
subject to (2), (3), and the perceived laws of motion of the states sh.6


























[(1 − τk,+1)r+1 +1− δ]
¸
.
The ﬁrst intratemporal optimality condition states that the relative price between
importables and non-tradables must equate the ratio of marginal utilities between
both goods. The next two (intertemporal) conditions are the standard Euler equations
that state that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption today and
tomorrow, must equate their relative price, evaluated at the cost of foreign borrowing
and the rate of return of capital investment, respectively.
3.1.2 The Firms
Three sectors with an equal number of representative ﬁrms produce the exportable,
importable, and non tradable goods. All sectors require capital as the only explicit
production factor.7 Next we state the problems faced by the ﬁrms.
T h eI m p o r t a b l eG o o d . The proﬁts of the representative ﬁrm are determined by
πm =( 1+τm)f (zm,k m) − (1 + τm)(1+τcm)rkm, (6)
where zm is a productive shock and km is the amount of capital demanded.
The problem of the representative ﬁr mc a nt h e nb es u m m a r i z e db yt h ev a l u e
function that satisﬁes:
V (sm)=m a x
km
{πm + βE [V (sm,+1)]}, (7)
6We deﬁne sh =( τm,τcm,τcn,p,e r,τk,r,k,b,F,πx,πm,πh).
7This setup is consistent with a model in which labor is sector speciﬁc.
6subject to the perceived laws of motion of the states sm.8
The ﬁrst-order optimality conditions are
f
0
km (zm,k m)=( 1+τcm)r, (8)
which states that the marginal cost of new capital must equate its marginal value.
The output of this sector can either be consumed or used as capital in any of the
three sector.
The Exportable Good. The proﬁts of ﬁrms producing the exportable good are
determined by
πx =( 1− τx)qf (zx,k x) − (1 + τm)(1+τcm)rkx, (9)
where τx is an export tax levied by the rest of the world, q is the relative price of
exportables in terms of importables, zx is a productive shock, and kx is the amount
of (importable) capital demanded by the exportable sector.
The problem of the representative ﬁr mc a nt h e nb es u m m a r i z e db yt h ev a l u e
function that satisﬁes:
V (sx)=m a x
kx
{πx + βE [V (sx,+1)]}, (10)
subject to the perceived laws of motion of the states sx.9
The ﬁrst-order optimality condition is
(1 − τx)qf
0
kx (zx,k x)=( 1+τm)(1+τcm)r, (11)
This equation presents the optimality condition equivalent to (14).
The Non Tradable Good. The proﬁts of the representative ﬁrm are determined
by
πn = pf (zn,k n) − (1 + τm)(1+τcm)rkn, (12)
where zn is a productive shock and kn is the amount of (importable) capital demanded
by the sector.
The problem of the representative ﬁr mc a nt h e nb es u m m a r i z e db yt h ev a l u e
function that satisﬁes:
V (sn)=m a x
kn
{πn + βE [V (sn,+1)]}, (13)
subject to the perceived laws of motion of the states sn.10
The ﬁrst-order optimality conditions are
pf
0
kn (zn,k n)=( 1+τm)(1+τcm)r, (14)
which state the optimality conditions of the sector that have to same interpretation
of (11).
8We deﬁne sm =( τm,τcm,r,z m).
9We deﬁne sx =( τx,τm,τcm,z x,q).
10We deﬁne sn =( τm,τcm,p,z n).
73.1.3 The Government
In this model, it is assumed that the government has no explicit objective function
to maximize but satisﬁes the following constraint:
g + F = τm(cm + i − f (zm,k m)) + τcm (1 + τm)(cm + i) (15)
+τcncnp +( 1+τm)(1+τcm)τkrk,
It is further assumed that a fraction κt of the total government expenditures are
used to consume the non tradable good produced in the economy.
3.1.4 Market-Clearing Conditions
Deﬁne the production of the exportable, importable, and non tradable goods by:
yx = f (zx,k x) (16)
ym = f (zm,k m)
yn = f (zn,k n).
The market clearing conditions are:
pyn = pcn + κg, (17)
CA ≡− (b+1 − b)=( 1− τx)qyx + ym − cm − (1 − κ)g − k+1 +( 1− δ)k − e rb,
where the ﬁrst equation describes the equilibrium in the non tradable good market
and the second the equilibrium in the importable good market, which shows that the
current account (CA) balance must be compensated by the capital account balance.
To avoid having to model the world credit market, and following Bhandari et al
(1990), Turnovsky (1997), and Osang and Turnovsky (2000), we assume that the
country faces an upward-sloping supply schedule for debt:
e r = e r(b), e r
0 > 0. (18)
3.1.5 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a set of allocation rules cm = Cm (s), cn = Cn (s),
k+1 = K (s),a n db+1 = B (s), kx,+1 = Kx (s), kn,+1 = Kn (s),a n dkm,+1 = Km (s),
a set of pricing functions r = R(s),a n dp = P (s),a n dt h el a w so fm o t i o no ft h e
exogenous state variables s+1 = S (s), such that
• Households solve the problem (4), taking as given s and the form of the functions
R(s), P (s),a n dS (s), with the equilibrium solution to this problem satisfying
cm = Cm(s), cn = Cn (s), k+1 = K (s),a n db+1 = B (s).
8• Firms of the exportable, importable, and non tradable sectors solve the prob-
lems (7), (10), (13), taking as given s and the form of the functions R(s),
P (s),a n dS (s), with the equilibrium solutions to these problems satisfying
kx,+1 = Kx (s), kn,+1 = Kn (s),a n dkm,+1 = Km(s).
• The economy-wide resource constraints (17) hold each period, and the factor
market clears:
Kx (s)+Kn (s)+Km(s)=K (s).
3.2 Functional Forms and Calibration
With the generic model speciﬁed, next we present the functional forms and the criteria
used to choose speciﬁcv a l u e so fp a r a m e t e r s .
3.2.1 Functional Forms
Next, we group functional forms in terms of Preferences, Production Technology,
Government, and Exogenous Prices.
Preferences We consider the following functional form:
u(cm,t,c n,t)=θmlncm,t + θn lncn,t,
with θm,θ n > 0 and θm + θn =1 .





where αi is the compensation for capital as a share of output of sector i for i = x,m,n.
The productivity shocks (zi) are assumed to follow AR(1) processes:







w h e r ew ea l l o wf o rc h a n g e so nt h el e v e lo ft h ep r o d u c t i v i t ys h o c k s( zi,t+1)a sac o n -
sequence of the FTAs.
Fiscal Variables Here we assume that the government is not optimizing any ex-












where we allow for changes on the level of government expenditures (gt+1)a sac o n -
sequence of the FTAs.
T h eo t h e rv a r i a b l e st h a tc o n f o r mt h eﬁscal variables (taxes and tariﬀs) are con-
sidered to follow AR(1) processes in order to allow for a slow adjustment to their new
values after the FTAs.
9Exogenous Prices Next we describe the functional forms chosen for the laws of
motion of two external variables: terms of trade (q) and the borrowing rate (e r)
discussed in (18).












where, as there is no obvious reason for considering otherwise, the unconditional
expectation of the (log of) terms of trade (q)i sn o ta ﬀected by FTAs.
Finally, as discussed above, we assume that the country faces an upward-sloping
supply schedule for debt and model it as:
e rt+1 =( 1− ρr)rt+1 +( 1− ρr)ϕ
bt
yt
+ ρre rt + vr,t+1, (19)
where ϕ>0 and rt+1 is set contingent on FTAs.
3.2.2 Calibration
Once the laws of motion are speciﬁed, we diﬀerentiate deep parameters from those
that are considered to be aﬀected by FTAs. Table 1 presents the values of the
parameters that are assumed to be unchanged by FTAs and Table 2 the values of the
parameters before and after FTAs.
Preference
β =0 .97 θm =0 .243 θn =0 .757
Production Function
αx =0 .45 αm =0 .5 αn =0 .3 δ =0 .06
Technology Shocks
ρx =0 .9 σx =0 .01
ρm =0 .9 σm =0 .01
ρn =0 .9 σn =0 .01
Fiscal Variables
κ =0 .92 ρg =0 .8 σg =0 .03
Exogenous Prices
q =0 .25 ρq =0 .86 σq =0 .01
ϕ =0 .06 ρr =0 .9 σh r =0 .001
Table 1: Deep Parameters
The parameters θm and θn are chosen so as to reproduce the share of consumption
on importables and non tradables over total consumption in steady state.11 The
11The consumption of importables was estimated as the diﬀerence between the GDP of tradables
minus total exports plus imports of consumption goods.
10subjective discount factor (β) was set to make it consistent with a 3% annual real
interest rate.
The ouput-factor elasticities in each sector (α) were set to match the sectorial
capital shares taken from national accounts (with a downward adjustment, as national
accounts ﬁgures include the retribution to independent workers). The depreciation
rate was set to 6%, while the constants of the production functions, government
expenditures, and terms of trade were set to match the participation of each sector
in total GDP. The autorregresive coeﬃcients and volatilities of the shocks were set
to match the autocorrelation of output and to adjust the speed of convergence to the
steady state (more below).
According to the features of the FTAs discussed on section 2, we proxy the eﬀects
of FTAs by:
• Reducing import tariﬀs:T h en e wt a r i ﬀ was computed by substracting from
the actual average tariﬀ the share of imports from US and EU times the tariﬀs
for the imports from those economies.
• Increasing the value added tax (to compensate the import tariﬀ reduc-
tion): The new value added tax was obtained from the model by computing
the increases in τcm and τcn (value added tax) necessary to compensate for
the reduction on import tariﬀs. The value thus obtained was of an increase of
0.75%.12
• Decreasing the export tax (to capture the eﬀect of increased market access
or reduced import tariﬀs on Chilean exports): The average export tax before
the FTA was calculated using the actual tariﬀs faced by Chilean exports in
t h eU . S .a n dE U ,a n da s s u m i n ga1 0 %t a r i ﬀ in the rest of the world (with the
exception of Mexico and Canada which are assumed to be zero). The export
tax after the FTA corresponds to 10% times the share of Chilean exports to the
rest of the world (that is, excluding the countries with which Chile has FTA
already in place).
• Increasing government expenditures (to capture the eﬀect of higher cost
of administration by the customs oﬃce): In contrast to unilateral trade liberal-
ization, FTAs impose additional roles for the domestic customs administrator.
Among them are the implementation of the schedules for gradual tariﬀ reduc-
tions on diﬀerent goods and services, certiﬁcation and veriﬁcation of rules of
origin, enforcement of piracy control to protect intellectual property, and the
enforcement of health and safety requirements. A recent projection by the Na-
tional Customs Service (Dietert 2004) estimates that a cumulative increase of
10% (distributed in 4 years) of the Service’s annual budget is required to expand
12The government increased the value added tax by 1%, from 18% to 19%. Part of this increase
w a ss a i dt ob er e q u i r e dt oﬁnance additional social programs.
11its duties derived from complying with Chile’s FTAs. This implies a cumulative
rise of the budget (at $22,720.9 m. or 0.0456% of 2003 GDP) by 0.0045% of
GDP, attaining a share of 0.05% of GDP after four years. Additionally, the
Agriculture and Livestock Service (SAG) has asked for a 25% increase in its
overall budget (El Mercurio, 2004). This is the amount that is said that this of-
ﬁce needs to conduct sanitary and phytosanitary checks of the increased exports
of the sector. The annual budget of SAG for the year 2003 was of $40,521.6 m.
The increased expenditure would then be equivalent to 0.10% of GDP. There-
fore, as a consequence of the rise in customs administration expenditure and
monitoring measures, total government expenditure rises by 0.15%.
• Increasing the consumption tax on importables (to capture the eﬀects of
increased property rights protection): One feature of the FTA with the U.S., is
the protection of intellectual property rights of copyrights and patents. Accord-
ing to US authorities neither Chilean copyright law nor patent law meet inter-
national standards. Thus Chile committed to take steps conducive to eliminate
piracy in software, music, and motion pictures. The United States International
Trade Commission (USITC) estimates the cost of Chilean piracy to the U.S.
industry at about US$80 m.13 This ﬁgure corresponds to 0.7% of the consump-
tion of importables. Changes in patent protection by Chile have an uncertain
eﬀect on the price of pharmaceuticals. If the law applies to new products, no
changes in the price of existing medicines should be expected. If the law applies
to existing products, their prices should rise. Here we only consider an increase
of 0.7% of the value added tax on importables.
• Increasing total factor productivity in all sectors (to capture the eﬀects of
higher economic cooperation on local R&D, and of higher trade integration due
to larger exposure of the local economy to technological advances elsewhere):
FTAs can have a direct impact on TFP through two channels. First, there may
be R&D spillover due to more imports from trade partners (Coe and Helpman,
1995; Keller, 1998). This channel considers that more trade rises the number
of intermediate inputs used and, through this, the total stock of knowledge
generated by domestic and foreign R&D activities. In that framework, total
factor productivity is a function of both domestic R&D and foreign R&D times
the import share of GDP, as a measure of integration with the rest of the world.
This latter eﬀect could be as large as the former, depending on the degree of
openness. To calibrate the model we assume that economic cooperation with
EU will increase the domestic resources allocated to R&D in 0.75%,14 and the
import share of total GDP will increase by 1.5%;15 thus increasing TFP. Using
13See USITC (The United States International Trade Commission, 2003).
14Equivalent to the EU providing 4 millions dollars per year for research project (0.75% of the
domestic R&D activities).
15This number is aproximately what comes as output of the theoretical model.
12Coe and Helpman’s estimates, the combined eﬀect on TFP amounts to a 0.5%
increase in the TFP of the three sectors in our model.
• Decreasing country risk: Regarding the interest rate at which Chileans can
borrow (e r in our model), in steady state, it must be equal to the reciprocal
of the subjective discount factor 3.1%=1/0.97). The parameters of (19) were
calibrated as follows: The parameter ϕ was ﬁx e da t0 . 0 6u s i n gt h er e s u l t so f
Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel (2004) who estimate a model for Chilean country
risk as a function of standard risk determinants and a dummy that takes a value
of 1 at the time the FTA were announced. The impact of the FTA could not
be measured precisely. The estimated reduction on the country risk due to the
FTA was found to vary from 0 to 78 basis points. Here we assume that the
FTA contributes to a 40 basis point decrease in the international rate that is
relevant for Chile. The value of r previous to the FTA was calculated taking
e r equal to 3.1% and a debt to GDP ratio equal to 0.3 (which is slightly higher
than the the value of the ratio for the year 2002, 0.371). Thus r is equal to




τcm = τcn =0 .18
τm =0 .02
τcm = τcn =0 .1875
Market access
τx =0 .057 τx =0 .051
Property rights protection
∆τcm =0 ∆τcm =0 .007
Higher administration costs









r =0 .01293 r =0 .00893
Table 2: Values of the Parameters before and after FTAs
4R e s u l t s
To quantify the potential eﬀects of the FTAs on the economy, we distinguish the
long run eﬀects (comparing steady states with and without FTAs) from the short
13run dynamics. The ﬁrst are obtained by computing the steady states of the models
with and without FTAs. The short run dynamic eﬀects require that we impose initial
conditions, solve the model (ﬁnd the policy functions of the control variables and the
laws of motion of the endogenous state variables), and characterize the transition to
the new steady state.
According to our speciﬁcation, the policy functions of the control variables cannot
be obtained analytically and we have to resort to numerical methods. We use a ﬁrst-
order approximation to the policy function using perturbation methods. This method
has been proven superior to traditional linear-quadratic approximations (Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe, 2004).
Next we present the results of both exercises.
4.1 Long Run Eﬀects
Table 3 presents the results of 7 exercises: tariﬀ reduction in Chile (∆τm), tariﬀ
r e d u c t i o ni nU Sa n dt h eE U( ∆τx), change in the VAT to compensate the tariﬀ re-
duction (∆τcm and ∆τcn) ,r e d u c t i o ni np i r a c y( ∆τcm), increases in the administrative
costs of the customs service (∆g), increases in TFP (∆z), and the combined eﬀect
of these changes. The table shows the percentage change in the variable of interest:
consumption of each good (cm,c n), physical production in each sector (Yx,Y m,Y n),
the reciprocal of the real exchange rate (p), government lump sum transfers as a
fraction of GDP (F, as a proxy for additional pressures on the government budget),
real imports (M), total real consumption (C), total real output (Y ), and welfare
compensation (TU).16
The ﬁr s tc o l u m ns h o w st h ei m p a c to far e d u c t i o no nt h ea v e r a g et a r i ﬀ (from 3.9%
to 2%). Ceteris paribus, this reduction increases the consumption of importables
and, due to an income eﬀect, the consumption of non-tradables. The reduction in the
price of the capital good (importable) rises t h ev a l u eo ft h em a r g i nal productivity in
the exportable and non-tradable sectors, while keeping it constant in the importable
sector (see equations 8, 11 and 14). Therefore Yx and Yn increase and Ym remains
constant. Total real output (at constant prices) increases by 0.53% and welfare rises
by 0.25%. Consistent with the tariﬀ reduction, the real exchange rate depreciates.
Finally, as the government collects less distortionary taxes, it has to lower F.
The second column (proxying market access) shows the reduction of the export
tax from 5.7% to 5.1%. It has the same eﬀect of a positive (and permanent) produc-
tivity shock on the sector (or equivalently a positive shock on terms of trade). It
raises income and therefore consumption, imports, tax collection, and welfare. It also
16To abstract from changes on relative prices, total consumption (C) and total output (Y )a r e
measured at the initial relative prices (before FTA). TU is deﬁned as the subsidy (tax if negative) in
terms of consumption of importables and non tradables that would be needed to compensate (take
from) the consumer in order for him to be indiﬀerent between the situation before and after the
change is made.
14Variables ∆τm ∆τx ∆VA T ∆τcm ∆g ∆TFP Combined
cm 0.75 0.87 -0.24 -0.39 -0.13 1.04 1.91
cn 0.09 0.36 -0.29 -0.10 -0.21 0.93 0.80
Yx 1.52 0.52 -0.52 -0.48 0.00 0.91 1.96
Ym 0.00 0.00 -0.63 -0.59 0.00 1.00 -0.22
Yn 0.28 0.22 -0.25 -0.13 0.03 0.76 0.91
p -1.18 0.50 0.05 0.29 0.08 0.10 -0.16
F -0.54 0.11 0.61 0.21 -0.18 0.13 0.34
M 1.60 1.18 -0.53 -0.50 -0.00 0.91 2.67
C 0.25 0.48 -0.28 -0.17 -0.19 0.96 1.06
Y 0.53 0.26 -0.35 -0.26 0.02 0.82 1.02
TU 0.25 0.48 -0.28 -0.17 -0.19 0.95 1.06
Table 3: Change in steady state values (percentage points)
induces a real exchanger a t ea p p r e c i a t i o n .
A change in value added tax, ceteris paribus, from 18% to 18.75%, to keep the
ﬁscal budget balanced, reduces consumption and output of all sectors. Despite the
endogenous increase in the lump sum transfer, the net welfare eﬀect is negative, while
having a negligible eﬀect on the real exchange rate.
The implicit increase in tax due to the elimination of piracy has the eﬀect of a
speciﬁc tax on importable goods (consumption and capital). This eﬀect reduces the
value of marginal productivity in all sectors (see equations 8, 11 and 14), the amount
of capital used in each sector, and thus total output. This new tax introduces a
negative real income eﬀect that reduces consumption and welfare. The eﬀect on the
consumption of the non-tradable good is mitigated by the change in the relative price
between importables and non-tradables: the real exchange rate appreciates.
In terms of welfare deterioration, increased government expenditures is roughly
equivalent to the increased tax on importables. As in our model an important part
of g goes to non-tradables, Yn raises and the real exchange rate appreciates. Private
consumption of both goods decline as F is negative to compensate the increase in g.
The largest eﬀect in this exercise comes from TFP, as reported in the sixth column.
The favorable productivity boost raises output in all sectors, with a positive eﬀect on
real income, real consumption, lump sum transfers and welfare. The real exchange
rate appreciates.
The ﬁnal column shows the eﬀect of all the changes at once, thus providing the
long run eﬀects of the FTAs. The agreements are welfare improving, since consump-
tion in all goods increase. Production of exportables and non-tradables rises while
production of importables falls. The ﬁnal eﬀect on real output and real consumption
are estimated at 1%. That is, the long run eﬀect of FTAs is a permanent increase of
1% in the level of output, measured at initial prices.
The eﬀects of a potential decline in the country risk premium are discussed below.
154.2 Impact and Dynamic Transition Eﬀects
In the long run, we model FTAs as permanent changes in the levels of tax rates levied
on diﬀerent sectors or as multiplicative shocks on their production functions. Thus, to
quantify the long run level eﬀects of the agreements we concentrated on comparisons
between two steady states.
Three issues are overlooked in the long run analysis: First, because of their nature,
FTAs are expected to produce gradual and not instantaneous changes in the variables
that intend to capture them. Second, potential costs and beneﬁts of FTAs have to
be evaluated considering the period in which they go into eﬀect (initial condition are
very diﬀerent from steady-state conditions). Finally, the structure of the economy
determinates the speed of convergence to the new steady state and the transitional
dynamics.
Next we describe the methodology used to compare the transitional dynamics of
the variables of interest due to the FTAs. Let s0 be the values of the state variables
in the initial period (that we calibrated to replicate the Chilean economy in the year
2002).17 Let Gi (·) be the policy functions of the control variables and Si (·) the
implied laws of motion of the state variables for scenarios i = B,A,R,CR. B is the
“before” FTAs scenario. A is the "after" FTAs scenario (that combines all broad
FTA features other than risk premium reduction, corresponding in the long run to
the Combined eﬀects of column 7 in Table 3). CR is the “country risk” scenario
that considers only the reduction of the country risk premium. R is the scenario that
combines all broad FTA features with the risk premium reduction (i.e. R reports the
linear combination of results under A and CR).
Using the policy functions, laws of motion, and initial conditions in all scenarios,
dynamic simulations are carried out for all variables of interest. Then, we compare
the dynamic trajectories of each variable under any with those of scenario B.
T a b l e4a n dF i g u r e1r e p o r tt h ei m p a c ta n dd y n a m i c - t r a n s i t i o ne ﬀects for Chile
under the three post-FTA scenarios.18 T a b l e4r e p o r t si m p a c te ﬀects at year 1 (equiv-
alent to 2003; pre-reform base-era zero is 2002), medium-term eﬀects at year 10, and
long-term eﬀects at year 50. As a result of the persistence of policy changes, pro-
ductivity shocks, and cost of foreign borrowing, combined with the discrepancies
between initial conditions and steady-state conditions, the economy converges slowly
to its steady-state equilibrium. Along the transition path, the cost of foreign bor-
rowing declines gradually from an initial level of 5% (at year zero or 2002) toward a
steady-state level of 3%, the inverse of the subjective discount factor.
T h ei m p a c te ﬀects of scenario A (combined FTA eﬀects except for risk premium
17Notably, we set the initial interest rate for borrowing from abroad (e r)a t5 %( i n s t e a do ft h ev a l u e
of 3.1% assumed for the steady state) and the level of b so as to obtain a debt-GDP ratio of 0.371.
We also set taxes, tariﬀs, and government expenditure at the values before the FTAs (described in
Table 2). Finally, we set the productive shocks in all sectors at -0.005.
18The consistency of the results was checked by simulating the transition for up to 1000 periods

















5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50








5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
C Y p
R versus B
Figure 1: Diﬀerential Eﬀects of FTAs on Selected Variables (percentage points)
17A vs. B CR vs. B R vs. B
11 0 5 011 05 0 11 0 5 0
cm 0.85 1.09 1.77 1.00 0.40 -0.70 1.84 1.48 1.06
cn -0.28 0.25 0.71 0.50 0.37 -0.27 0.20 0.62 0.44
Yx -1.15 1.43 1.88 0.29 0.61 0.08 -0.87 2.04 1.96
Ym -2.02 -0.67 -0.31 0.35 0.74 0.09 -1.68 0.05 -0.22
Yn -0.30 0.49 0.85 0.36 0.33 -0.14 0.06 0.81 0.71
p 0.82 -0.36 -0.22 0.50 0.02 -0.43 1.31 -0.34 -0.64
C -0.01 0.46 0.98 0.62 0.38 -0.38 0.60 0.83 0.60
Y -0.66 0.73 1.12 0.34 0.44 -0.06 -0.32 1.17 1.06
Table 4: Transition (percentage points, years after FTAs start)
reduction) reﬂect lower output and a real exchange rate appreciation as a result of the
increased government expenditures and VAT taxation. Consumption on non trad-
ables decreases and imports increase. Quickly afterwards, the expansionary eﬀects of
trade liberalization dominate the contractionary eﬀect of higher VAT taxation on con-
sumption. At year 10 (or 2012), aggregate consumption and output have increased by
0.46% and 0.73%, respectively, and the exchange rate has depreciated by 0.36%. Sub-
sequently all key variables converge monotonically toward their steady-state values,
which were reported in the last column of Table 3.
Under scenario CR, the 0.4% decline of the country risk premium reduces the
cost of borrowing quicker than under the B or A scenarios. This causes a small boom
in consumption and investment, leading to higher accumulation of foreign liabilities.
Hence the possible credibility gain of FTAs reduces for a temporary (but prolonged)
period the cost of capital and of borrowing, quickening the adjustment of interest
rates from their initial (2002) level of 5% toward the steady-state value of 3%. On
impact, aggregate consumption and output rise by 0.62% and 0.34%, respectively,
and the exchange rate appreciates by 0.50%, in response to the spending boom. Over
time, the economy accumulates more foreign debt, which has to be serviced with
higher interest payments abroad. Hence at the new steady state (when the cost of
borrowing has declined to 3%), consumption and output are lower than in the pre-
FTA (B) scenario and the exchange rate is more depreciated. The welfare eﬀects
depend on the value of the discount factor, as consumption is initially higher and the
lower than under the B scenario. With the discount factor considered here, welfare is
improved under the CR scenario. Finally one should recall that this scenario is based
on a 40 basis-point reduction in Chile’s country risk premium, a parameter estimate
that lacks robustness and may vary between zero and 78 basis points.
Our third scenario (R) combines scenarios A and CR and compares them to sce-
nario B. The hump-shaped (non-monotonic) dynamic response of aggregate output
and consumption of scenario CR is intensiﬁed by its interaction with the monotonic
response of C and Y of scenario A. On impact and during the ﬁrst two decades,
18consumption and output respond most strongly under this scenario. But toward the
steady state, the eﬀects for C and Y are diminished by the increasingly negative
income eﬀect due to higher net foreign liabilities. Once again, the negative eﬀect of
the increased VAT and government expenditures dominate the other changes in the
short run.
5 Concluding Remarks
Chile has put into place broad free trade agreements (FTAs) with its two major
trading partners: the EU (eﬀective 2003) and the US (eﬀective 2004). This paper
provides estimates of their economic eﬀects for the Chilean economy, stemming from
the conventional trade components (lower tariﬀs and higher market access) and other
aspects of the latter broad FTAs, including improved intellectual property rights,
factor productivity gains, and their ﬁscal consequences (tax compensation, larger
customs expenditure). The paper also considers that the country risk premium may
decline and aggregate investment may rise in response to the institutional stability
and policy credibility strengthened by the FTAs.
We set up a three-sector dynamic general equilibrium model for a small open
economy, inhabited by representative inﬁnitely-lived agents that face an upward-
sloping supply of foreign capital, reﬂecting an endogenous country risk premium. The
model has been calibrated to the main features of Chile’s actual trade agreements
with the EU and the U.S. and to base year 2002, including estimates of the likely
consequences of the agreements on selected variables.
Simulation results for key sectors and aggregate variables are reported for steady
states and dynamic transition paths under three scenarios. In scenario A we have
shown the response of the Chilean economy to the combined FTA eﬀects other than
the risk premium reduction. Long-term (steady-state) GDP, aggregate consumption
(C), and welfare rise by approximately 1% under this scenario. Imports and exports
grow by 2.7% and 2.0% respectively, and the real exchange rate depreciates by 0.2%.
The composition of output and consumption changes according to the FTA-induced
changes in tariﬀs, taxes, and relative prices. Most of the long-term beneﬁts — 91% of
the gain in C and 80% of the gain in Y — stem from one FTA externality: the rise
in production eﬃciency (TFP) that stems from higher trade and EU cooperation.
Dynamic transition eﬀects build up gradually over time, after negative impact eﬀects
at year 1. This eﬀect is due to an initially stronger eﬀect of VAT and government
expenditures increases over the beneﬁce ﬀects of tariﬀ reductions.
Under scenario CR we have considered a 40 basis-point reduction in Chile’s coun-
try risk premium stemming from higher institutional stability and policy credibility.
Therefore the cost of borrowing falls quicker from the initial (2002) 5% to the long-
term 3% than under the pre-FTA scenario. This causes a small boom in consumption
and investment, leading to a higher accumulation of foreign liabilities that has to be
serviced with higher interest payments abroad. Hence, consumption and output are
19lower than in the pre-FTA scenario in the new steady state.
The ﬁnal scenario has combined scenarios A and CR,r e ﬂecting a linear com-
bination of the two preceding cases. The hump-shaped (non-monotonic) dynamic
response of aggregate output and consumption of scenario CR is intensiﬁed by its
interaction with the monotonic response of C and Y of scenario A.O ni m p a c ta n d
during the ﬁrst two decades, consumption and output respond most strongly. But
toward the steady state, the eﬀects for C and Y are diminished by the increasingly
negative eﬀect due to higher net foreign liabilities.
How do our results compare to those reported by the preceding literature on
Chile’s trade agreements? First, we have considered a larger number of components
and consequences of Chile’s broad FTAs than the preceding studies summarized in
section 1. Second, we have calibrated our model to the actual features of the FTAs and
their ﬁscal ﬁnancing, and to the Chilean economy in 2002. Third, our model allows to
consider impact, dynamic transition, and steady-state eﬀects of FTAs, while previous
studies — based on static optimization — focus only on steady-state eﬀects.
Regarding our results for all combined FTA eﬀects other than the risk premium
reduction, our steady-state eﬀects (1% gain in Y , C,a n dw e l f a r e )a r eo ft h es a m e
order of magnitude than preceding studies. Eﬀects are small because the FTA-induced
changes are generally small, too.
However, our simulation results for the country-risk reduction are diﬀerent in
nature and eﬀects than those reported in previous papers. First, a lower country
risk premium causes a temporary consumption and investment rise that is reversed
in the medium to long term as foreign liabilities are accumulated and the economy
converges to the (exogenous) steady-state interest rate. Second, the magnitude of the
consumption and output response is much smaller than in most preceding studies.
Are Chile’s free trade agreements with the EU and the U.S. a big deal? We have
to respond to this question in the negative when comparing our results to those of
some of the preceding studies. But our results should come as no surprise. Small
changes elicit small beneﬁts. However, an alternative perspective leads to the opposite
conclusion. Chile’s broad FTAs have been big deals when compared to their costs.
A permanent increase in 1% of aggregate private consumption and GDP are very
signiﬁcant beneﬁts when put on the balance with the costs incurred by Chile during
a decade of trade negotiations with the United States and the European Union.
20References
Albagli, E. and K. Schmidt-Hebbel (2004). “Sovereign Debt Premium and Free Trade
Agreements in Chile,” Manuscript. Central Bank of Chile.
Bhandari, J., N. Haque, and S. Turnovsky (1990). “Growth, External Debt, and
Sovereign Risk in a Small Open Economy,” IMF Staﬀ Papers 37, 388-417.
Brown, D., A. Deardorﬀ, and R. Stern (1998). “Computational Analysis of the Acces-
sion of Chile to the NAFTA and Western Hemisphere Integration,” Discussion
Paper 432, University of Michigan.
Brown, D., A. Deardorﬀ, and R. Stern (2001). ““Multilateral, Regional, and Bilateral
Trade Policy Options for the United States and Japan,” Manuscript,U n i v e r s i t y
of Michigan.
Cabezas, M. (2003) “Tratado de Libre Comercio entre Chile y Estados Unidos: Re-
visión de Estudios que Cuantiﬁc a ns uI m po r t a n c i a , ”Central Bank of Chile Work-
ing Paper 239, Santiago Chile.
Coe T. and H. Helpman, (1995). “International R&D Spillovers,” European Economic
Review 39, 859-887.
C o e y m a n s ,J .E .a n dF .L a r r a í n( 1 9 9 4 ) .“ Efectos de un Acuerdo de Libre Comercio
entre Chile y Estados Unidos: Un Enfoque de Equilibrio General,” Cuadernos
de Economía 31 (94), 357-99.
Dietert, K. (2004) “Minuta tentativa para Simulación del Gasto del Servicio Nacional
de Aduanas por Posible Impacto de los Tratados de Libre Comercio”. Manuscript,
Servicio Nacional de Aduanas, Chile.
El Mercurio (2003). “El TLC Aportará Crecimiento Cero,” June 8, pp D6.
El Mercurio (2004). “Control Fitosanitario: SAG pide más Fondos para Cumplir con
TLC,” April 30, pp B2.
Harrison, G., T. Rutherford, and D. Tarr (1997). “Trade Policy Options for Chile:
A Quantitative Evaluation,” Policy Research Working Paper 1783, The World
Bank, Washington, D.C.
Harrison, G., T. Rutherford, and D. Tarr (2001). “Chile’s Regional Arrangements and
the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas: The Importance of Market Access,”
Policy Research Working Paper 2634, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Harrison, G., T. Rutherford, and D. Tarr (2003). “Chile’s Regional Arrangements:
T h eI m p o r t a n c eo fM a r k e tA c c e s sa n dL o w e r i n gt h eT a r i ﬀ to Six Percent,” Cen-
tral Bank of Chile Working Paper 238, Santiago, Chile.
21Hinojosa-Ojeda, R., J. Lewis, and S. Robinson (1997). “Convergence and Divergence
between NAFTA, Chile, and MERCOSUR: Overcoming Dilemmas of North and
South American Economic Integration”.
Keller, W. (1998). “Are International R&D Spillovers Trade Related?: Analyzing
Spillovers among Randomly Matched Trade Partners,” European Economic Re-
view 42, 1469-81.
Osang, T. and S. Turnovsky (2000). “Diﬀerential Tariﬀs, Growth, and Welfare in a
Small Open Economy,” Journal of Development Economics 62, 315-42.
Schmitt-Grohé, S. and M. Uribe (2004). “Solving Dynamic General Equilibrium Mod-
els Using a Second-Order Approximation to the Policy Function,” Journal of
Economic Dynamics & Control 28, 755-75.
SIA Chile-EU (2002). “Sustainable Impact Assessment of the Trade Aspects of Nego-
tiations of an Association Agreement between the European Communities and
Chile,” Manuscript, Planistat Luxembourg, Luxembourg.
Turnovsky, S. (1997). “Equilibrium Growth in a Small Economy Facing an Imperfect
World Capital Market,” Review of development Economics 1, 1-22.
USITC (2003). U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economywide and Se-
lected Sectoral Eﬀects, Publication 3605, June.
22Appendix
Features of Chile’s FTAs with the EU and the U.S.
23MAIN FEATURES OF CHILE’S FTA WITH THE UNITED STATES
Tariﬀs
- Total elimination of tariﬀs over 12years
- Elimination of luxury tax (4years)
- Elimination of price bands
- Elimination of agricultural subsidies to goods
exported to Chile over 12 years
- Elimination of quantity constraints
Rules of origin
-M o r eﬂexible than in other FTAs
- Allows self certiﬁcation
Customs mechanisms
- Improving customs mechanisms and facilitation
of customs procedures
Sanitary and phitosanitary
measures - Comply with WTO agreements
Technical barriers to trade
- Comply with WTO agreements
- Experts’ committees — consultation to solve disputes
Trade defense
- Restricts safeguards
- Only during transition period
- Cost rebate with other measures
to compensate safeguards
- Antidumping and compensatory measures
- Comply with WTO agreements
Government procurement
- Most favored nation treatment (already
eﬀective in Chile)
- US allows Chile to participate in
public purchases
- Rules for government procurement:
Publication — information — rules — tender oﬀers
Labor
- Ratify ILO treaties
- Domestic regulations according to ILO standards
- Cannot become barriers
- No weakening of legislation
- Labor Aﬀairs Council (consultation - arbitration)
- Labor cooperation mechanism (info -
recommendations - monitoring)
24MAIN FEATURES OF CHILE’S FTA WITH THE US (continued)
Investments
- Most favored nation treatment
- Non-discriminatory treatment compared
to domestic investors
- Insurance against expropriation and destruction
- No performance requisites, neither to accept nor to
grant advantages to invest
- Consultation to monitor compliance
- Right to adopt extraordinary measures in case of
crisis (restrictions on capital ﬂows)
- Investor- government dispute settlement:
Arbitration — proceedings — binding clauses
Non-ﬁnancial services
- Most favored nation treatment
- Non-discriminatory treatment compared to
domestic producers
- Temporary entry facilities to business relations
- Visa facilities
Financial services
- Most favored nation treatment
- Non-discriminatory treatment compared to domestic
producers
- Transparency in regulations
- Financial Services Committee
- Dispute settlement — Arbitration
- Freedom to set regulations, but no discrimination
Telecommunications
-R a t i ﬁcation of already signed commitments with WTO
- Establish rights, obligations, and access
- Most favored nation treatment
- Non-discriminatory treatment compared to domestic
producers
- Pro-competition regulation
- Independent regulatory organization
- Transparency
E-trade
-N ot a r i ﬀs on products than can be unloaded from the
Internet
- Most favored nation treatment
- Non-discriminatory treatment compared to domestic
producers
- Importance of cooperation
Transparency - Communication - publication - courts - procedures
Dispute settlement - Proceedings




- Compatible with Chilean legislation
- Adopt laws to maintain pro-competition organizations
- Cooperation area of competence
- Non-discriminating rules fostering competition for state
enterprises and designated monopolies
- Transparency — consultation
Intellectual property rights
- Ratify or adhere to multilateral agreements. Compliance
with the agreements have to be attained by 2007 (2009)






- Patents (develop system over 4 years)
- Most favored nation treatment
- Non-discriminatory treatment compared to domestic
producers
- Cooperation of intellectual property bureaus
- Proceedings - indemnities - precautionary
measures - border measures
Environment
- Independence, but with commitment to protect
environment
- Not changed to encourage or discourage trade
- Environmental Aﬀairs Council (monitor chapter -
cooperation)
- Consultation — arbitration — rules of procedure
- Recognition of international environmental agreements
-C o o p e r a t i o n
- Record pollutant emissions and transfers in Chile
- Reduce mining pollution (US to assist Chile)
- Improve compliance and supervision of
environmental regulations
- Share experiences
- Reduce agriculture contamination (Chile)
- Reduce emissions of methyl bromide
- Enhance protection and management of wild life
- Increase use of clean fuels
26MAIN FEATURES OF CHILE’S FTA WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION
Tariﬀs
- Exemptions to tariﬀ elimination in some agricultural
and ﬁshery products
- Possibility of increasing tariﬀ in case of damage to
domestic production, but with conditions and
compensations established
- Elimination of non-tariﬀ barriers
- Most favored nation treatment for tax burden and
other regulations
Customs mechanisms
- Facilitate and speed up mechanisms — customs’
cooperation
Technical barriers to trade - Regulations - committee - transparency
Trade defense
-S a f e g u a r d s
- WTO agreements
- Procedures (information - investment -
revision - commission)
- Antidumping and compensatory measures
-C o m p l yw i t hW T Oa g r e e m e n t s
Government procurement
- Public procurement
- Non-discriminatory treatment compared to domestic
producers
- Transparency - announcements - procedures
Non-ﬁnancial services
- Elimination of barriers
- Most favored nation treatment
- Non-discriminatory treatment compared to domestic
producers
- Future revision of circulation of individuals
Financial services
- Most favored nation treatment
- Non-discriminatory treatment compared to domestic
producers
- Maintains regulatory authority
- Special ﬁnancial services committee
- Speciﬁc rules for dispute settlement
- Liberalization of capital movements (possibility of





- Simpliﬁcation and availability of interconnection
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E-trade - Cooperation




- Domestic pro-competition rules
- Information on regulatory changes between parties
- Conﬂicts: consultation - information - conﬁdentiality
- Technical assistance
Intellectual property rights -R a t i ﬁcation of multilateral agreements
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